(forthcoming) which reports a field experiment on individual giving when a lead donor provides challenge gifts with various match ratios. The study finds: (1) the size of the donor base is increased with the matching approach; (2) the per capita donation from small donors is first increasing, then decreasing in the match ratio; and (3) the total amount raised is increasing in the match ratio. 3 A number of papers address the role of lump-sum seed money in fund-raising. Andreoni (1998) argues that many charitable projects involve significant fixed costs and can only be undertaken if a minimum threshold of total funds raised can be surpassed.
Leadership seed money can help clear this hurdle. Another explanation for the importance of leadership gifts focuses on an information asymmetry about the quality of the projects undertaken by charitable organizations. The announcement of a leadership gift can help signal the high quality of the particular project and therefore increase donations in a fund-raising campaign; see Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006b) . List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) provides experimental results showing that increased seed money increases both the participation rate of donors and the average gift received from participating donors. 4 Our comparison of matching schemes and lump-sum seed money is based on a model of the private provision of public goods. To crystallize the difference between the two fund-raising methods, we assume that there is no information asymmetry about the quality of the provider of the public good. That is, neither the presence of a large donor nor the fund-raising method chosen signals the quality of the charity.
In the first part of the analysis, the number of donors and the amount of the leadership gift are given. Our primary result is that, for a given leadership gift, the matching approach generates a higher amount of total donations than does lump-sum seed money. We then examine the relationship between small donors' contributions and the match ratio. Will an increase in the match ratio, making the public good "cheaper,"
lead to an increased contribution from small donors? The comparative static results show that the relation can be either positive or negative and this ambiguity is demonstrated through numerical examples. When the small donors' gifts are decreasing in the match ratio and a lead donor can choose both the size of his gift and the method of fund-raising, then matching is always the lead donor's preferred option. However, the charity will disagree whenever it could raise more if the lead donor were restricted to choosing an amount to be provided as seed money. A sufficient condition to rule out conflict between a charity and its benefactor is that small donors do not decrease their individual donations in response to an increase in the match ratio.
The model is then extended to include the publicity of leadership gifts and the tax deductibility of donations, respectively. We relax the assumption that the number of donors is fixed and incorporate the impact of the leadership gift on the size of the donor pool. Because the media routinely report large leadership gifts, there can be a positive relation between the size of the leadership gift and the size of the donor base. We show that each small donor will donate less when the donor base increases. Nevertheless, the overall effect of an enlarged donor base on the total amount of donations will be nonnegative under either fund-raising approach.
Finally, assuming that tax receipts are not used to increase the production of the public good, the impact on individual donations of an increase in the personal tax rate is ambiguous. Intuitively, when the tax rate increases, an individual's disposable income decreases. Therefore, the income effect on individual donation is negative. On the other hand, donations are tax deductible, which makes the public good relatively cheap. The substitution effect is positive. The net result of a change in the tax rate on individual donations is ambiguous. However, the existence of a personal income tax does not change the result that small donors contribute more under a matching scheme than under the seed money approach.
Section 2 describes the model and derives the major results when the number of donors and the size of the leadership gift are fixed. Section 3 examines the relation between the match ratio and small donor contributions, the resultant leadership gift and the total raised. In Section 4 we examine the relation between the size of the donor base and the total amount raised, emphasizing the publicity effect of a leadership gift. In Section 5 we show that matching is the preferred of lead donors who choose both the size of their gift and the method of packaging but that the charity may disagree. Section 6 uses examples of small donor utility functions to illustrate the paper's results. Section 7 focuses on small donor preferences for seed money versus matching schemes. In Section 8, we discuss the impact of an income tax on individual donations. Section 9 contains conclusions and extensions.
2: Matching versus seed money for a given donor base and leadership gift
A nonprofit organization whose budget comes from voluntary donations is assumed to produce G units of a public good. All money raised goes directly to the provision of the public good. Unlike Andreoni (1998), we do not assume that the total funds raised must exceed some minimum level before it is feasible to produce the public good.
There are two kinds of donors: a lead donor and N small followers. The public good model we adopt was introduced by Warr (1982 Warr ( , 1983 and Bergstrom et al. (1986) . U U x G = is continuous and strictly quasi-concave. Individuals have diminishing marginal utility with respect to both the public and private good: 1 0 U > , 2 0 U > , and 11 0 U < , 22 0 U < . Furthermore, we assume that increasing consumption of the public good will not reduce the utility from an additional unit of the private good; i.e., 0 12 ≥ U .
2.1: The seed money scheme
Assume the large donor gives 0 g . Subject to her wealth m i , each small donor i chooses her donation i g to maximize her utility conditional on the other donors' contributions j g :
x g m + = , and 0, 0
We consider the Nash Equilibrium of the public good game played among the small donors. The proof that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium is in Bergstrom et al. (1986) . For simplicity, we assume an identical, homogeneous population of small donors.
The Nash equilibrium level of donation is then the same for each small donor.
In the Nash equilibrium, every small donor will donate ** g . Throughout the paper we will use a double asterisk (**) to denote a value under the seed money approach and a single asterisk (*) to denote a value under the matching approach.
The first-order condition is
with equality at an interior optimum. The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied:
2.2: The matching scheme
We initially assume that for every dollar raised from small donors, the lead donor has agreed to give $h dollars. The lead donor's pockets are assumed to be deep enough.
Given that small donors are identical and all other small donors contribute at the level g, a representative small donor's optimization program is:
subject to: i i i
We assume U is such that an interior solution is always attained and the first-order
Relation (4) 
2.3: Comparison of the two schemes
Given a match ratio h, the large donor will be called upon to give
That same large gift could instead have been packaged as seed money. There is a striking difference between the small donor's optimality conditions under the two approaches.
Under the matching gift approach, if the small donor reaches an interior optimum
That is, the marginal utility from an additional unit of the public good is less than the marginal utility of private consumption at the optimum. Under the seed money approach, if the small donor reaches an interior optimum donation level,
Intuitively, diminishing marginal utility suggests that small donors will donate more under the matching scheme. (2) must also hold as an equality. The equality variant of (2) and relation (4) can be rewritten as relations (5) and (6) left-hand-side of (5) is greater than or equal to the left-hand-side of (6). But this implies that the right-hand-side of (5) must then be no less than the right-hand-side of (6). Since fixed leadership gift, the charity always prefers a matching scheme since individual donations will be larger and hence total donations will be larger: 
A disagreement between the charity and the benefactor about the optimal design of the fund raising campaign can only arise when 0 g is not fixed and the benefactor determines both the design of the campaign and the amount to donate. Whether a conflict then arises depends on just how the small donors' gifts are affected by the size of the benefactor's leadership gift. As will be seen in Section 5 and Subsection 6.3, a conflict can arise when an increase in the match ratio leads to a decrease in individual donations. The following section examines the relation between the match ratio and individual donations.
3: The Relation between the Match Ratio and Donations

3.1: The relation between the match ratio and individual donations
In this subsection, we focus only on the reaction of small donors with respect to a change of match ratio h and ask whether a higher match ratio will lead to higher individual donations. We assume for the moment that for a given h a deep-pocketed benefactor provides the necessary matching amount * hNg .
Applying the implicit function theorem to the first order condition in (4) 
The denominator in (7) Although it is possible that individual contributions decline with an increase in the match ratio, the total donation (including the matching grant) is always increasing in the match ratio. A small donor can think of 1/[ ] 1 h + as the "price" of the public good relative to the private good. An increase in the match ratio is analogous to a decrease in the relative price of the public good, yet such a price decrease can lead to decreased individual expenditure on the good. If both goods were private goods, the assumption of a non-negative cross-partial derivative of the utility function (i.e. 12 0 U ≥ ) would rule out Giffen goods. Here, we see an interesting contrast between a private good and a public good. In the public goods situation, an increase in the match ratio not only reduces the price for the public good, but at the same time affects the "effective" budget of small donors.
Given the small donor reaction function,
is the price of the public good in terms of the private good. An increase in the match ratio has two effects on the small donor's maximization problem. Not only is the price of the public good reduced, which given 12 0 U ≥ would in itself lead to the purchase of more of the public good, the donor's "effective" wealth is altered. The
is the small donor's "social income," as pointed out by Becker (1974) , which augments the private income m of small donors due to the nature of a public good. In an equilibrium where small donations decline in response to a decrease in the price of the public good each small donor suffers a reduction in their "effective"
wealth. The reduction in small donor "effective" income more than offsets the anticipated substitution effect.
3.2: The relation between the match ratio and total donations
Proposition 3: Given a fixed number of small donors, the total donation to a charity is always positively related to the match ratio.
Proof:
The first order condition of the Program in (3) can be written as
Consider two match ratios,
A h and
B h , with
A B h h > and suppose that in fact
The first order conditions corresponding to match ratio of
and
The assumption that 1 0
h h > has the following contradictory implications: The lefthand-side of equality (8) is no greater than the left-hand-side of equality (9), but the righthand-side of equality (8) is strictly greater than the right-hand-side of equality (9). QED
3.3: The relation between the match ratio and the lead donor's gift
Given a match ratio of h the benefactor will be called upon to provide a matching grant of ( )
Proposition 4: Given a fixed number of small donors, the benefactor's matching gift is always positively related to the match ratio.
Proof: Suppose in fact that the leadership gift did decline with an increase in h. Since
= is the product of the match ratio and the aggregate of individuals'
donations, a decrease in the leadership in response to an increase in h implies that the aggregate of individuals' donations must have declined. But if in aggregate individuals donations has declined and the benefactor's matching gift has also declined, the total donation to the charity must have declined. But such an outcome contradicts Proposition 3. Proposition 3 states that an increase in the match ratio will always increase the total donation to the charity. QED Proposition 4 places a lower bound on the elasticity of individual donations with respect to the match ratio. Since ( ) ( )
. Even when there does exist a negative relationship between each small donor's gift and the match ratio, a 1% increase in the match ratio will never lead to a greater than 1% decrease in individual giving.
3.4: The charity's desired match ratio
Proposition 3 states that the charity raises more funds whenever a benefactor is willing to fund a matching grant at a higher match ratio. Proposition 4 states that the higher the match ratio the greater the demand on the benefactor's generosity. Thus a charity will always prefer the largest feasible match ratio given the maximum leadership gift the benefactor is willing to provide. If the benefactor is willing to donate up to g , the charity will chose h as the solution of ( )
4: The Size of the Donor Base and the Size of the Leadership Gift
In prior sections we held the number of small donors N fixed. This section first discusses the comparative static of 
4.1: An exogenously determined donor base
Under the seed money approach, we can easily use relation (2) , if 0
That the small donors' contributions are negatively related to the size of donor pool is not surprising: it is a manifestation of the "free-riding" nature of public goods. But the freeriding can never be so severe as to lead to a reduction in the total amount raised-a reduction in the total amount raised would mean each individual found less to free-ride on. Individual donations fall as N increases, but total donations are non-decreasing.
Similarly, under the matching gift approach, (4) 
Again, individual donations fall and total donations rise as N increases. 
4.2: An endogenously determined donor base
We now consider the case where N is endogenously determined by the size of the leadership gift and assume that the relation between the two is positive. This could be attributed to a free publicity effect because the media routinely reports large donations irrespective of whether the gift takes the form of a matching grant or lump-sum seed
money. An alternative signaling explanation of a positive relation is due to Andreoni 
, through two channels. We examine how the total amount raised and each individual's donation responds to an increase in the benefactor's seed money gift. First consider an individual's donation.
6 In Callen et. al. (2003) , the definition of "major" donors is left to the discretion of the organization staff member who filled the survey. They find that major donors constitute 26% of the board on average. The greater the proportion of major donors on the board is, the lower the administrative expenses as a proportion of total expenses.
Proposition 5 and the publicity effect of 0 g on N establish that the first term on the righthand-side of (10) is non-positive. To determine the sign of the second term, again apply the implicit function theorem to (2).
[ ] 
The leadership gift crowds out individual donations and the second term in (10) This counter-intuitive result can arise when the increased publicity does not affect individuals' preferences between the private and public goods. If leadership gifts are a signal of better governance of the charity, each potential donor may become more willing to donate. For simplicity, the paper proceeds by continuing to assume that 0 g affects only the potential donor base N but does not affect the individuals' utility functions U. List and Lucking-Reilly (2002) document that the existence of a seed money leadership gift increases the participation rate which is consistent with the gift being a signal that the charity is of a higher "quality."
Now consider the effect of an increase in the seed money gift on the total amount raised.
Proposition 5 and the publicity and/or signaling effect of 0 g on N establish that the first term on the right-hand-side of (12) is non-negative. The second term in (12) 
Thus a larger seed money gift means a larger total amount raised by the charity.
4.2.2: A matching scheme and an increase in the leadership gift
We first assume that the publicity/signaling effect relates to the announced match ratio.
As will be seen, the matching grant required from the benefactor will be increasing in the match ratio, just as it is when N is fixed. Hence a larger announced h will still be synonymous with a larger announced leadership gift.
When the size of the donor base depends on the match ratio, the match ratio has two effects on the optimal individual donation:
We examine how individual donations and the total amount raised respond to an increase in the benefactor's match ratio. First consider an individual's donation.
Proposition 5 and the publicity and/or signaling effect of h on N establish that the first term on the right-hand-side of (14) is non-positive. Proposition 2 has shown that sign of the second term may be either positive or negative. Hence we are unable to uniquely sign the effect of an increase in the match ratio on the size of individual donations. But we can
show that the total donations to a charity increase with an increase in the benefactor's match ratio. The proof of Proposition 7 mirrors that of Proposition 4. Propositions 6 and 7 imply that a charity will always prefer the largest feasible match ratio given the maximum leadership gift a benefactor is willing to provide. If the benefactor is willing to donate up to g , the charity will chose h as the solution of
Propositions 6 and 7
mean that a larger matching-grant gift means a larger total amount raised by the charity.
Thus we have established that when a lead donor is prepared to contribute a larger amount, the charity will never turn it down, partially or completely out of a concern that the leadership gift will more than crowd out individual donations. And this is so irrespective of whether the leadership gift is packaged as seed money or a matchinggrant. The total amount of funds raised is always increasing in the leadership gift under either approach. The charity will always prefer that any given leadership gift be packaged as a matching grant. But we have not established that a benefactor who determines the size of their leadership would want it so packaged. The next section considers the possibility of conflict between the charity and its benefactor concerning the optimal design of the fund-raising scheme.
5: The Lead Donor's Preference for Seed Money versus Matching
So far, we have discussed matching and seed money systems taking the size of the leadership gift as given. In this section, we consider the lead donor's utility maximization problem and address the issue of which system he prefers.
Let 0 g′ denote the lead donor's optimal gift if the charity uses a matching system and let 0 g′′ denote the lead donor's optimal gift if the charity uses a seed money system.
G g′ is the total amount raised when the charity uses a matching system and the lead donor donates 0 g′ .
, where the function ( ) donation to the match ratio h. Recall that for a given value of 0 g , the charity never finds it optimal to choose a value of h such that
G g′′ denote the total money raised by the charity when the charity uses a seed money system and the large donor donates 0 g′′ .
( ) ( )
denotes the utility of the lead donor who makes a gift of 0 g′ to a charity that uses a matching system.
denotes the utility of a lead donor who makes a gift of 0 g′′ to a charity that uses a seed money system.
Since 0 g′ is chosen optimally given a matching system it must be that (
Proposition 1 established that, for a given leadership gift, the charity always raises more money with a matching system than with a seed money system; i.e.,
Inequalities (15) and (16) give A conflict of interest between a charity interested in maximizing the total donation and a lead donor interested in maximizing his own utility can arise if
. In this event, the total amount raised for the charity is lower under a matching system, despite it being preferred by the lead donor. Whether a conflict arises depends not on the lead donor's utility function, V, but on the small donors' utility functions, U. What matters is how the small donors react to a change in the leadership gift when the charity uses a matching system. A sufficient condition to rule out conflict between a charity and its benefactor is that the small donors do not decrease their individual donations in response to an increase in the match ratio.
Proposition 9: If individual donations are non-decreasing in the match
ratio, the charity will always be able to raise more money under the lead donor's preferred matching grant scheme than under a seed money scheme.
Proof:
Suppose otherwise and that instead ( ) ( )
. This inequality 
The first inequality follows from Proposition 1 and the second inequality follows from Equation (13). But this creates a contradiction.
The first-order conditions for the lead donor under the matching and seed money systems are then, respectively,
and ( ) ( )
Equation (18) is an equality since 0 0 0 g g ′′ ′ > ≥ and we are considering an interior solution for the optimal leadership gift under a seed money system.
Recall from Proposition 7 that the match ratio and the leadership gift are positively related. The condition in Proposition 9 that * 0 dg dh ≥ then implies that the term in square brackets on the right-hand-side of (17) is greater than or equal to unity. Hence
Given Equation (11), the term in square brackets on the right-hand-side of (18) is less than or equal to unity and hence
Recall that 1 2 11 22 12
and its immediate implication that 0 0 g g ′ ′′ < , the left-hand-side of (19) must be less than the lefthand-side of (20). But the right-hand-side of (19) must be greater than that of (20). This creates a contradiction. Therefore, it can not be the case that
We turn now to a series of numerical examples that illustrate the paper's results.
6: Three Examples
In this section, we use three examples of small donor utility functions to show that individual donations can rise, fall or be unchanged by an increase in the match ratio. The first example considers Cobb-Douglas utility and shows that an individual donor's contribution is unrelated to the match ratio h. The second example considers a square root utility function and shows that an individual's donor's contribution is an increasing function of h. The final example of a mixed power and exponential utility function illustrates the possibility that an individual's donation may be at first positively and then negatively related to h. This third example fits the finding from the field experiment in Karlan and List (forthcoming) .
In the first two examples in which the small donors' optimal contribution is nondecreasing in the match ratio, the charity and its benefactor both prefer a matching system. In the third example, the small donors' optimal contribution can be decreasing in the match ratio. We use this third example to demonstrate that the charity can prefer a seed money system while the benefactor prefers a matching system. 
That is, the individual donation is positively related to the income level m and negatively related to the size of the donor base N. Interestingly, g is not related to the matching ratio h. A higher match ratio might tempt a small donor to give more since the relative price of the public good has fallen. But this small donor reasons that the lead donor will be giving more even if small donations remain unchanged. The resultant diminution in marginal utility from any additional unit of the public good exactly offsets his desire to give more when the price of the public good falls. It is interesting to note that when g 0 is too large, small donors will not contribute to the public good at all, simply because the amount given by the large donor is deemed to be sufficient-in fact they would prefer it if the lead donor had reduced his gift to the charity and given some money to each of them. There is complete "crowding-out" of small donations. Every would-be small donor prefers instead to be a free-rider.
Comparing the individual donation levels in (21) and (23), it is clear that small donors will contribute more under the matching gift approach.
The total amount raised under a seed money scheme, including the amount pledged by the lead donor, is
Comparing (24) with (22), we see that the total amount raised under the seed money approach will be smaller than that under the matching gift approach. Furthermore, we can see the positive impact of increasing the number of small donors on the total donation under either approach. Thus, an increase in the donor base has a higher marginal impact on total funds raised under the matching gift approach than under the seed money approach. Under the seed money approach, small donors' preferences take the form:
[ ]
The first-order condition is 
Substituting (26) into the first term of (27), we have the comparative static result:
Since 0 < α < 1, the denominator of Equation (28) [Insert Figure 1 Here] Proposition 9 established that a necessary condition for there to be disagreement between a lead donor and a charity about whether to use a seed money or matching system is that there is a non-monotonic relation between small donor contribution and the match ratio. We can illustrate such disagreement in Example 3 if we specify the utility Note that the lead donor's marginal utility from the public good is higher than that of small donors and the lead donor is wealthier than the individual small donors.
Numerical solutions for the small donor contribution * g and the total donation * G corresponding for various match ratios are reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 1 .
Column 1 contains the match ratios themselves. Note that * G becomes equal to unity for a match ratio somewhere between 0.6 and 0.7. The small donors' optimal contribution is increasing for 0.6 h < and decreasing for 0.7 h > . Column 4 shows the leadership gift corresponding to each match ratio, namely
The small donor contribution ** g and the total donation ** G under a seed money system given an identical leadership gift are reported in columns 3 and 6.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Consider two particular match ratios, h = 1.4 and h = 3. At a match ratio of 1.4 the lead donor will be called on to make a leadership gift in the amount of 0.7952 if the matching approach is adopted. Each of the ten small donors will contribute 0.0568 to the charity, and the total donation, including the lead donor's gift, will be * 1.3632. G = If instead the seed money approach is adopted for the same leadership gift, then each small donor will contribute nothing, which brings the total donation to ** 0.7952 G = . For the parameter values in this example, complete crowding out once the seed money leadership gift reaches around 0 0.5. g = At a match ratio of 3, the lead donor will be asked to donate 1.407 to the charity and each of the small donors will contribute 0.0459. The total donation will be
If instead a leadership gift of 1.407 had been used as seed money, then each small donor will contribute nothing and ** 1.407 G = .
If the lead donor is free to choose between the two approaches, then he is better off by donating 0.7952 and using the matching approach with the match ratio set at h = 1.4. His utility, * V , associated with each match ratio is given in column 7. His utility associated with the corresponding seed money gift, ** V , is given in column 8. For the match ratios reported in Table 1,   * V attains a maximum at h = 1.4 which requires a leadership gift of 0.7952. For the various levels of leadership gifts considered in Table 1 and a seed money system, ** V attains its maximum when 0 1.407 g = . A leadership gift of 1.407 will be required if a matching system is used and the match ratio is set equal to 3.
Thus, between the two levels of leadership gift being considered here, 0 0.7952 g = and 0
1.407 g = , the lead donor prefers a leadership gift of 0.7952 and a matching system to a leadership gift of 1.407 and a seed money system.
The key observation is that the lead donor prefers the matching approach, which allows him a higher level of utility. But the charity will prefer using the seed money approach since it leads to a larger total amount of donations. This example shows that due to the negative reaction of the small donor's contributions to an increase in the leadership gift in the matching system, there are cases where a conflict of interest exists between the lead donor and the charity.
We now turn to an examination of small donors' preferences for seed money versus matching schemes.
7: Small Donor Preferences for Seed Money versus Matching Schemes
Each small donor contributes more under the matching gift scheme (recall Proposition 1) and her consumption of the private good is reduced by some amount Δ.
The upside of this shift is that each donor will enjoy NΔ more of the public good. The tradeoff here is Δ additional units of private consumption versus NΔ additional units of the public good. She may or may not be better off with a matching system depending on her utility function, the number of small donors and the size of the leadership gift. We can show this by considering the Cobb Douglas example of Section 6.
Under a matching gift scheme, each small donor's utility is
Under the seed money approach, each individual small donor's utility is [ ]
We calculate a small donor's utility level under various assumptions on N and the i.e., it is easier to get corner solutions to the utility maximization program under the seed money approach. This can be seen in Equation (23) The first order condition is 
The denominator in (31) is always negative. The numerator may be positive or negative. Intuitively, when the tax rate increases, the individual disposable income decreases. Therefore, the income effect on individual donation is negative. On the other hand, donations are tax deductible, which makes the public good relatively cheap. The substitution effect is positive. The net result of a change in tax rate on the individual donation is ambiguous.
We can now reexamine the problem of individual donations in the presence of a leadership gift. Under the scheme with a match ratio h, the total donation is
The first order condition is:
Under the seed money approach, the total donation is [ ]
The first order condition is: Recall that in the proof of Proposition 1, we compared individual donations under matching grant schemes and.seed money schemes. The first order conditions in (32) and (33) with a tax rate of τ correspond to the first order conditions (6) and (5), respectively.
The size of the leadership gift is set at the same value under the two approaches.
Following the steps in the proof of Proposition 1, establishes that given a personal income tax, individual small donors contribute more under the matching system. 
9: Conclusions and Extensions
We have compared two approaches to fund-raising when there is a large donor: a matching gift versus seed money. We have assumed that the nonprofit organization has a perfect efficiency ratio: every dollar of donations is spent on the provision of the public good. Under both approaches the total amount raised is increasing in the size of the leadership gift; i.e., an increased leadership gift never crowds out more in small donations than it adds directly. This means that the charity should never turn down a major leadership gift, partially or fully, because of a concern about crowding out.
The paper's primary result is that, for any given leadership gift, a matching approach will always raise more in total than a seed money approach. Whether the matching gift approach make small donors better off than an equal gift of seed money depends on small donors' utility functions, the size of the donor base and the size of the leadership gift. A publicity-related link between the size of the potential donor base and the size the leadership gift has no affect on the paper's results. But if the leadership gift is a signal of the quality of the charity, a larger leadership gift may lead more small donors to participate and to increase their contributions.
The relationship between an individual's voluntary contribution and the match ratio is ambiguous. But the larger the match ratio, the larger the amount the lead donor will be called up to contribute. Even if each small donor's contribution does decrease, the decline in the amount to be matched is always more than offset by the increase in the match ratio. When small donors' contributions are negatively related to the match ratio, there can be instances where the lead donor strictly prefers the matching approach, while the charity prefers the seed approach. The charity will prefer seed money provided the benefactor's optimal donation is sufficiently larger under a seed money approach that the charity raises more in total. Thus, when small donors' contributions are negatively related to the match ratio, there is the potential for conflict between the charity and its benefactor.
One direction for future research is to examine efficiency ratios and the governance of non-profits. Efficiency ratios are not one. The amount spent on the public good is less than the charity's total donations by the amount of its fund-raising and administrative expenses. A charity's management may seek to maximize the net amount raised, the gross amount raised or the difference. Management who seek to maximize the production of the public good will recognize that administrative and fund-raising expenses should be chosen as optimal inputs to the production of donations. A management team more interested in the perceived status associated with managing a bigger organization may seek to maximize donations per se and will overspend on fundraising. A corrupt management team will simply seek to maximize the fund-raising and administrative "expenses." In the latter two cases, donors act as a discipline mechanism since their decisions are based on the net amount raised as modeled in this paper.
Another direction is to apply this paper's results on matching gifts to corporate employee matching grant schemes and their potential conflict with shareholder value maximization. A socially responsible company can fund an employee matching grant scheme through a reduction in the wages paid to its philanthropic employees. The company's shareholders bear no cost. Why then is the company's board feted for its "generosity"? Because their adoption of a corporate matching grants scheme allows the employees to co-ordinate and achieve an equilibrium combination of private and public good consumption that they prefer to that attained when they are paid more but make their donations without a match. The charity is able to raise more than it could in the equilibrium of individual donations from better-paid employees. In doing so, the board has implemented a Pareto improvement and demonstrated that it is "socially responsible"
without reducing investors' profits 
